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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The nature of relation between the ownership structure and corporate governance 
structure has been the core issue in the corporate governance literature. From a firms’ 
perspective, ownership structure determines the firms’ profitability, enjoyed by different 
stake-holders. In particular, ownership structure is an incentive device for reducing the 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and management, which can be 
used to protect property rights of the firm [Barbosa and Louri (2002)]. With the 
development of corporate governance, many corporations owned by disperse 
shareholders and are controlled by hire manager. As a results incorporated firms whose 
owners are dispersed and each of them owns a small fraction of total outstanding shares, 
tend to under-perform as indicated by Berle and Means (1932). Latter this theoretical 
relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and its performance is empirically 
examined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shlefier and Vishny (1986). 
In most of developing markets including Pakistan, the closely held firms (family or 
state-controlled firms or firms held by corporations and by financial institutions) 
dominate the economic landscape. The main agency problem is not the manager-
shareholder conflict but rather the risk of expropriation by the dominant or controlling 
shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders. The agency problem in  these 
markets is that control is often obtained through complex pyramid structures,1 interlock 
directorship,2 cross shareholdings,3 voting pacts and/or dual class voting shares that allow 
the ultimate owner to maintain (voting) control while owning a small fraction of 
ownership (cash flow rights). The dominant shareholder makes the decisions but does not 
bear full cost. The negative impact that large family shareholders can have on firm value  
Attiya Y. Javid <attiyajavid@pide.org.pk> is Senior Research Economist at the Pakistan Institute of 
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1Pyramids are a particular form of inter-firm shareholding arrangement in which firm A holds a stake in 
firm B, which holds a stake in firm C. The distinguishing characteristic of pyramid arrangement is that firm A is 
attempting to exercise control over firm C while minimising its financial investment in firm C, either directly or 
indirectly. 
2That occurs when a firm’s employee sits on other firm’s board, and that firm’s employee sits on the 
first firm’s board. These employees are generally the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or another person high in 
management of their respective firms. 
3
 Cross-holding means company Y directly or indirectly controls its own stock.  
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can be even greater when family members hold executive positions in the firm. The 
choice of a family member as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) can have a significant 
impact if the individual does not have the talent, expertise or competency to run the 
business. The opportunity cost created by a suboptimal appointment will be shared by all 
shareholders while the private benefits accrue entirely to the family [Peres-Gonzalez 
(2001)].  
There is another presumption in the literature that large shareholders have power 
and stronger incentive to ensure shareholder value maximisation [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Zeckhouser and Pound (1990); Burkart (1997)]. The empirical evidence on 
corporate governance suggests that large owners have stronger incentive and better 
opportunities to exercise control over manager than small shareholders. Claessen, 
Djankov and Pohl (1996 and 1999) find evidence of a positive relation between 
shareholding concentration and firm performance, Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) only 
partly confirmed that observation. Block-holder ownership above a certain level may lead 
to entrenchment of owner-mangers that expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders 
[Fama and Jensen (1983); Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988); Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)]. A negative effect of market value on ownership concentration is proposed and 
supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The literature on corporate governance also pays 
much attention to the issue of shareholders identity. The implication is that it matters not 
only how much equity a shareholder owns, but also who is this shareholder—a family, a 
private person, worker, manager, financial institution or foreign enterprise. However 
much of the existing literature is based on the functioning of developed markets’ firms, 
and therefore presumes a wider dispersion in ownership structure than one find in 
developing markets like Pakistan where large share holdings are common.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000) 
have shown that the countries with weak legal environment, the original owners tries to 
maintain large positions in their corporations which results in concentration of ownership. 
Equity ownership by insiders can align insider interest with those of shareholders, 
thereby leading to greater firm value [Klapper and Love (2002)]. In underdeveloped 
markets in addition to weak legal enforcement reasons, due to underdeveloped nature of 
financial markets that would allow limited access to external financing and result in 
predominance of family firms [La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998); Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 
(2000)]. In case of Pakistan the majority of the firms are owned by the family or 
institution [Cheema, Bari, and Saddique (2003)]. Further the researchers have 
comprehensively studied the conflict between managers and owners regarding the 
functioning of the firm for developed markets, although, the research on understanding 
the differences in behaviour of different shareholder identities is limited for emerging 
markets. 
Corporate Governance reforms started with the introduction of Corporate 
Governance Ordinance in 2002. There is little work done to examine the association 
between corporate governance and corporate ownership pattern in case of Pakistan. 
Cheema, et al. (2003) identify only the nature of corporate ownership structure in 
Pakistan without analysing its impact on corporate performance. The present study tries 
to fill the gap of needed research area on the relation between corporate ownership and 
corporate governance in context of Pakistan.  
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The main focus of this study is to investigate whether the equity ownership 
structure matters in case of Pakistan and its implications for corporate governance and 
corporate valuation. The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
important empirical studies concerning the relationship between corporate governance, 
ownership structure and corporate value. Section 3 describes the empirical specification 
of the model and Section 4 presents the discussion of the empirical results. Last section 
concludes this study.  
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
After the influential study of Berle and Means (1932) the separation of corporate 
ownership from control has given rise to large literature devoted to elaborating, refuting or 
testing it. Hassen (1983) argues that if, as Berle and Mean claim, corporate officers are 
promoting their own financial interests at the expense of the shareholders, then the remedy 
is to encourage shareholders to pay an active role in nominating and electing directors and 
thus influence the selection of the officers who run the enterprise. While Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that introduction of managerial share ownership may reduce these 
agency problems, thus aligning the interest of managers and shareholders. They assert that 
firm value is reduced when ownership and control are separated due to added costs of 
monitoring and the managers participate in activities that may not enhance firm value for 
the owners. However, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a,1983b,1985) maintain that 
there are efficiencies to separating ownership and control into decision-making and risk-
bearing functions which make dispersed ownership advantageous because the efficiency 
gains outweigh the agency costs. The findings of Graff (1950) and Feinberg (1975) suggest 
that organisations with combined ownership and control, owner-operators may choose to 
exchange profits for other benefits, such as choosing current over future consumption 
[Fama and Jensen (1985)] and on-the-job non-pecuniary consumption [Demsetz (1983)]. 
Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) argue that concentrated ownership has its costs when 
large shareholders, capable to influence corporate decision directly, maximise value for 
themselves and deprive small owners of their part of residual income. Other negative 
consequences of ownership concentration includes raised cost of capital due to lower 
market liquidity or decrease diversification opportunities on the part of the investors [Fama 
and Jensen (1983)], prevents additional monitoring of managers by the stock market 
available under diffused ownership with high liquidity of shares [Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1993)]. La Porta, et al. (1999), Claessens, et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) find 
that publicly traded companies in most countries possess a higher level of ownership 
concentration. Yeh (2003) in Taiwan, Dzieranowski and Tamowicz (2004) in Poland and 
Cheema, et al. (2003) in Pakistan find that the companies’ shares are common concentrated 
in the hand of largest shareholders. 
When shareholders are too diffused to monitor managers, corporate assets can be 
used for the benefit of the managers rather than for maximising shareholder wealth. 
Therefore a solution to this problem is to give managers equity stake in the firm. Doing 
so will resolve the moral hazard problem by aligning managerial interests with of 
shareholders Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). Stulz (1988) demonstrate that 
sufficiently high managerial ownership, by allowing managers to block takeover bids, 
can lower firm value. Using US data, Morck, et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes 
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(1990, 1995), Hermalin and Weisbch (1991); and Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan 
(1999) all find firm value to rise with low levels of managerial ownership and to fall with 
higher levels of managerial ownership. 
As regards the effects of foreign investment on firm performance, it is argued that 
the observed higher productivity of foreign-owned firm because they are 
disproportionately concentrated in high productive sectors [Griffith (1999) and Oulton 
(2000)], by active monitoring, complementing the inadequate or inefficient monitoring of 
domestic institutions Choi and Yoo (2005), source of not only financing but also scarce 
monitoring skills and control-enabling property rights in emerging markets [Khanna and 
Palepu (1999)], foreign shareholders outperform firm in which foreign shareholders 
exercise effective control [Chhibber and Majumdar (1999)]. 
There is an extensive theoretical literature on the role and incentive of financial 
institutions/banks monitoring non-financial corporations. Chirinko, Ees, Garretsen and 
Sterken (1999) explain that financial institutions might be important mainly because of 
their role as supplier of debt but also as equity holder and their representation on 
supervisory board. Jensen (1989) argues that joint ownership of debt and equity by large 
informed investors (such as Japanese bank) results in stringent managerial monitoring 
and create strong incentive for managers to make value-maximising decisions. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) are also of the view that financial institutions are well 
positioned to monitor the manager of the firm within their network. Lichtenberg and 
Pushner (1994) study support the proposition that equity ownership by financial 
Institution in Japan effectively substitute for the missing external takeover4 market by 
resulting in monitoring and intervening when necessary, thus reducing the incidence and 
severity of lapses from efficient behavior. Sheard (1989, 1991) and Morck and Nakamura 
(1999) propose that financial institution equity block primarily as anti-takeover barriers. 
The firm performance varies substantially for different types of owners. Pakistan where 
large share holdings are common [La Porta, et al. (1999); Cheema, et al. (2003)], it seems 
more interesting to explore the link between concentration of ownership and its identity 
with performance.  
3.  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
The corporate governance literature makes an important distinction between 
ownership of voting rights and ownership of cash flow rights. Corporate ownership is 
measured by cash-flow rights, and control is measured by voting rights [Faccio and Lang 
(2001)]. If controlling shareholders have a majority of voting rights but own negligible 
cash flow rights, they have little incentive to take steps to increase the value of the firm’s 
equity. However, as controlling shareholders’ ownership of cash flow rights increases, 
any action they take to benefit themselves at the expense of other equity holders has a 
cost in that it decreases the value of the shares controlling shareholders own. If 
controlling shareholders own almost all of the cash flow rights, it makes little sense for 
them to expend resources to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders [Doidge, Karolyi, Lins and Stulz (2005)].  
4Takeovers: if a firm is inefficiently operated, then there is scope for improved performance if an 
outsider (or some of current shareholders) take over the firm, replaces its management, and initiates a new 
business strategy [Yafeh (2001)]. 
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The definition of the ownership in this study relies on cash flow rights of equity 
stakes rather than on voting rights.5 The ownership variables included are: ownership 
concentration (T5), managerial shareholding (Dir) separately to access block-holders and 
directors ownership affects on performance of across firms.  To delve deeper in to this 
issue the concentration of ownership is split into four separate groups of owners: family 
owners (fam), foreign owners (for), financial institution owners (fin) and individual 
owners (ind). The natural logarithm of the percentage of shares held by each category of 
ownership type is used. To reduce arbitrariness the construction of our ownership 
variables is either based on legal requirements by Pakistani law or is supported by 
previous empirical literature. 
The top five shareholders as proxy for the ownership concentration is used to 
analysis that whether corporate ownership affects corporate governance and corporate 
performance or not. In top five shareholders there is no distinguish between different 
categories of shareholders. Any cut-off level for inclusion of any shareholder in top five 
categories is not used.6  The family ownership is considered as percentage of share held 
by husband, wife, son, and daughter and other family members, whose surname are same 
as family members where the founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or 
marriage. Foreign ownership are defined as percentage share held by companies which 
are incorporated outside Pakistan but have a place of business in Pakistan under the 
companies Ordinance, 1984, “Foreign Companies”. The Ordinance also defines a foreign 
subsidiary as a company in which more than 50 percent of the equity is held by a single 
foreign company. In Pakistan there is no legal limit by the government for minimum and 
maximum level of equity holding by foreign investors as compare to India where no 
foreign investor hold more than 51 percent equity stakes of a firm.  
Financial Institutions /Banks Ownership7is defined as financial institutions in 
the sample represent legal minority shareholder (holding at least 10 percent of  
5Controlling shareholders use pyramiding schemes and cross-holding as a means of separating the cash flow and 
voting rights, and to enhance their company control rights. To measure such structure, the data for both the ultimate cash 
flow ownership stakes and voting power held by the management group and its family for all of firms is needed, but data 
on ultimate voting rights is not available.  However to the extent that effective managerial and family control can be 
established at some level below 100 percent, control and cash flow rights will inherently be separated. Generally, 
managerial control of 51 percent of the shares will confer unequivocal control rights. In such a case, controlling managers 
that divert one dollar from the firm for personal gain will bear at most 51 cents of the cost. Any further separation of control 
from cash flow rights via pyramids and superior voting shares may be a second-order effect [Doidge, et al. (2005)].  
6The idea behind 10 percent of the shares is that the passage of special resolution under the Pakistan 
Companies ordinance of 1984, as a result of which alteration in a firm’s activities can be made only by the 75 
percent majority vote of shareholders in favour of such resolution. Only 10 percent class of shareholders have 
the ability to block the members’ special resolutions that are necessary to make significant changes. Moreover, 
disclosure of the aggregate of shareholding, restriction on the sale of shares to public are all associated with 
more than 10 percent holding of shares. 
7Under the financial institutions ordnance, 2001 “Financial Institution” are defined as; (i) any company 
whether incorporated within or outside Pakistan which transacts the business of banking or any associated or 
ancillary business in Pakistan through its branches within or outside Pakistan and includes a government 
savings bank, but excludes the State Bank of Pakistan;  (ii) a Modaraba or Modaraba management company, 
leasing company, investment bank, venture capital company, financing company, unit trust or mutual fund of 
any kind and credit or investment institution, corporation or company; and (iii) any company authorised by law 
to carry on any similar business, as the Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, specify 
(The Financial Institutions Ordinance, 2001,XLVI of 2001).  
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share holders on average).8 The percentage of total equity shares mainly held by 
Banks, National Investment Trust (NIT), a unit trust and Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan (ICP) that is a development financial institution are included. The reforms 
of the 1990s have transformed the structure of the financial sector in Pakistan. In 
order to increase competition the government started privatising the national banks 
and other financial institutions. The assets share of banking institutions in the 
private sector has increased from 7.8 percent in 1990 to about 55 percent in 2002 
[Cheema, et al. (2003)]. However their equity investment remains low as compare 
to ICP and NIT.9 Consequently, the effect of financial institution’s ownership on 
performance in case of Pakistan is likely to be different. Director ownership is the 
share ownership by management and board of directors varies substantially across 
firms. The shares held by directors and officers irrespective of whether managers 
are part of family or a professional manager hired by the family or by the foreign 
firm.   
3.1.  Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
The empirical evidence suggests that in Pakistan ownership is concentrated 
[Chemma, et al. (2003) and La Porta, et al. (1999)]. Most firms are closely held either by 
families, directors, foreign or institution owners. To distinguish among different 
ownership type in the analysis, the ownership type is controlled in the ownership model 
and separate estimate of determinants of ownership for directors’ ownership are also 
provided. As mentioned above a block holder is defined to be any entity owning more 
than 10 percent of the firm equity. In the absence of adequate investor protection 
concentration of ownership becomes a more important tool to resolve agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholder [Shleifer and Wolfenson (2002)]. 
Therefore the hypothesis tested is that there is association between concentration of 
ownership and quality of corporate governance practices following the empirical 
specification of the model proposed by Pistor, et al. (2003), Durnev and Kim (2006) and 
Klein, et al. (2005) is used: 
itiiiiii CGILwLevSizeInvCGIOwn *54321 … (1) 
In the model Owni is the ownership concentration by top five shareholders of firm 
i at time t. CGLi is a vector of corporate governance index, Invi is investment 
opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, Levi is leverage defined as book value 
of long term debt/book value of total asset, Lwi is rule of law that is used for the proxy of 
enforcement of law, and Sizei is measured by the log of total asset. it is random error 
term.  
8The Company Ordinance, 1984 and the Code of Corporate Governance do not recognise minority 
shareholders with a shareholding below 10 percent. The minimum threshold for seeking remedy from the Court 
against mismanagement and oppression requires initiation of the company by no less than 20 percent of the 
shareholders. Shareholders representing 10 percent can apply to SECP for appointment for inspector for 
investigation into the affairs of the company. See section 263 and 290 of the Company Ordinance,1984 
9According to Cheema, et al.(2003) in their investigation of investment composition of local private 
companies the sole contribution of ICP/NIT in equity capital of Textile sector is 8.4 percent as compare to 5.1 
percent of other financial institutions, and 11.1 in Non-Textile sector as compare to 8.2 percent of other 
financial institutions. 
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It is expected that shareholders with greater cash flow rights practice lower quality 
corporate governance. The owner shareholders of the firm with more profitable 
investment opportunities divert less for outside shareholders gain and practice high 
quality governance [Durnev and Kim (2006) and Johnson, et al. (2000)]. There is 
opposite finding that growing firms dilute their ownership to spread risk of expansion 
[Shleifer and Wolfenson (2002)]. As regards the firm level variables, the firm size is used 
as control variable and expects to have an inverse relationship between firm size and 
ownership concentration due the risk neutral and risk averting effects because the market 
value of a given stake of ownership is greater in larger firm, this higher price should 
reduce the degree of concentration. At the same time risk aversion should discourage any 
attempt to preserve the concentration of ownership in face of larger capital because this 
would require the owners to allocate more of their wealth to single venture [Domsetz and 
Lehn (1985)]. Following La Porta, et al. (1998) the ownership concentration of the firm 
is related to legal environment of the country, the rule of law index as a proxy for the 
efficiency of the legal environment is used as interactive variable. It is expected to find 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and law enforcement because in 
countries like Pakistan with poor investor protection ownership concentration might 
become a substitute for legal protection as shareholders may need to own more capital in 
order to exercise control.   
3.2.  Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
The deficiency of external governance mechanism that is weakness of investor 
protection and absence of well developed market for corporate control leads investor to 
rely on governance structure that is dominated by highly concentrated ownership. In this 
section the impact of ownership concentration on the firm performance is examined. The 
firm performance improves when ownership and managerial interest are merged through 
concentration of ownership [Agrawal and Mandeike (1990)]. The reason is that when 
major shareholdings are acquired, control can not be disputed and resulting concentration 
of ownership might lower or completely eliminate agency costs. In addition block holders 
might provide an opportunity to extract corporate resources for private benefits in a way 
that would have a negative effect on firm valuation. To test the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between concentration of ownership and firm performance, the model 
suggested by Pistor, et al. (2003) and Klein, et al. (2005) is estimated. The model is given 
below: 
ititiiiii OwnLwSizeInvSizeCGIOwnPerf *6543211 (2) 
Where Perfi is measure of performance for firm i at time t, return on assets ROA, 
return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q, remaining variables are same as defined for 
model (1). When profitable investment opportunities are there, the controlling 
shareholders divert to concentrated ownership and corporate valuation become 
higher. The positive relationship between ownership and firm value is higher in weak 
legal environment [La Porta, et al. (2002); Durnev and Kim (2006)]. It is expected 
that firms with better investment opportunities, better corporate governance practices 
should have higher valuation. 
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3.3. Ownership Identity and Firm Performance 
Since the type of ownership concentration might vary across firms according to the 
identity of large shareholders. It is postulated that the relationship between larger 
shareholder and firm performance depends on who the large shareholders are. The 
concentration of ownership is split into four separate groups: family ownership (Fam), 
financial institutional ownership (Fin), foreign ownership (Fore) and individual 
ownership (Ind). To avoid multicolinearity the managerial ownership is not included in 
the model. The affect of managerial ownership on performance is also investigated 
separately. The following model proposed by Pistor, et al. (2003) is estimated to 
determine the relationship between ownership identity and firm performance:  
itiiiiiij
j
ji OwnLwLevSizeInvOwnPerf *43210  … (3) 
Where Ownij is the percentage of share held by owner of type j of firm i at time t and 
other variables are the same as used in model (1) and (2). There has been increasing 
concern about the endogeneity issue of ownership variables in literature [Himmelberg, et 
al. (1999) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985)]. The system generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation technique is used on the panel data to deal with this issue. The lag 
dependent and explanatory variables are used as instruments following Arellano and 
Bond (1991).  
3.4.  Data 
To assess the relationship corporate governance and ownership structure at 
firm level, the data of 60 non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange which 
are most active and representative of all non-financial sectors are used. The data set 
is obtained from the annual reports of these firms for the year 2003 to 2008. The 
corporation fully owned by the government of Pakistan and corporation from 
financial sector such as bank and insurance companies because valuation ratios for 
financial corporations are not comparable to those of non-financial corporations The 
analysis is started from 2003 for our analysis because the Corporate Governance 
Code 2002 start implementation from 2003 and public information about listed 
companies’ detailed ownership structure became available for the first time only in 
2003. For each firm the ownership structure information is obtained from the 
company’s annual reports which are required by the Company Ordinance, 1984 in 
form 34 and Code of Corporate Governance under clause XIX (i). The block-holder 
is defined as any individual, director, associated company, foreign investor or 
financial institution has 10 percent or more shareholdings. The 10 percent rule is 
applied because 10 percent or more shareholding has the ability to block company’s 
special resolution. The Category and Pattern of Shareholding report the names and 
holdings of large shareholders, directors, specifies any family relations between 
them, and identifies the owners of companies that are large shareholders as well 
intuitional holdings and related parties’ holdings. With this data set the ownership 
categories directors’ shareholdings, financial institution holdings foreign investor’s 
holdings, and block-holder with 10 percent shareholding are constructed.  
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The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency index are used 
which are developed by the authors in their study [Javid and Iqbal (2007)]. In order to 
construct corporate governance index for the firms listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor 
corporate governance rating is done which is based on the data obtained from the annual 
reports of the firms submitted to SECP. The index construction is as follows: for every 
firm, twenty-two governance proxies or indicators are selected; these indicators are 
categorised into three main themes. The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight 
factors for the board composition index, seven for ownership and shareholdings index 
and seven for transparency, disclosure and audit index. The weighting in the construction 
of index is based on subjective judgments. The assigned priorities amongst and within 
each category is guided by empirical literature and financial experts in this area. The 
maximum score is 100, a score of 100 is assigned if factor is observed, 80 if largely 
observed, 50 for partially observed and 0 if it is not observed. The average is taken out 
for all the factors belonging to the sub-index and we arrive at the rating of one sub-
index.10 By taking the average of three sub-indices we obtain the aggregate corporate 
governance index for each firm in the sample. 
Data on rule of law has been taken from World Bank governance indicators. The 
ranking of rule of law as ranging from 0 to 1 for Pakistan is 0.34 as average of six years. 
That indicates very poor legal environment for Pakistan in term of enforcement of law.11 
Financial data on the sample firms are compiled from the balance sheets, profit and loss 
accounts, cash flows statement and notes to the accounts of the annual reports of the 
corporations. The size is defined as natural logarithm of total asset and growth of sales is 
taken as investment opportunities. The leverage is defined as ratio of book value of long 
term debt to book value of total asset. The data of all these variables are obtained from 
the annual reports of the listed firms in the sample.  
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The analysis is started by exploring the determinants of ownership concentration. 
The measure of ownership concentration is defined as percentage of share owned by the 
largest five shareholders in a firm, and a block is defied as to be any entity owning more 
than 10 percent of the firm’s equity. The model (1) is estimated for five specifications 
with aggregate CGli index and with sub-indices that are board composition index, 
shareholdings and audit index, disclosure and transparency index. The results are 
presented in Table1. 
The results suggest that there is negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and quality of corporate governance. Durnev and Kim (2006) find there is 
positive relation between cash-flow rights and corporate governance, however, Morck, et 
al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue that greater ownership concentration 
may align their interest with minority shareholders, but it results in greater degree of 
managerial entrenchment.  The  transparency scores score when included in the model the   
10Sub-Index includes (i) Board composition index, (ii) The ownership and shareholdings Index, (iii) 
Disclosure and Transparency index. 
11Although as Pakistan belongs to common law countries legal origin. In view of La Porta, et al. (1997) 
common law countries provide strong investor protection in term of law on books. The ranking of rule of law 
indicate the fact that enforcement of law is very low against high ranking on law on books.  
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Table 1 
Determinants of Concentration of Ownership by Top Five) 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
CGIi  –0.02** 
(–1.56)    
Board  0.01 
(3.98)  
0.20* 
(4.61) 
Disc   –0.01 
(–0.51) 
0.17 
(0.93) 
Inv 0.56* 
(3.14) 
0.73* 
(4.04) 
0.56* 
(3.14) 
0.07** 
(2.22) 
Size –0.01* 
(–2.30) 
–0.11* 
(–7.43) 
–0.01 
(–2.53) 
–0.01*** 
(–1.59) 
Lev 0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
0.01 
(0.64) 
0.08 
(0.76) 
CGILw * 0.02 
(0.27) 
–0.05 
(–0.97) 
–0.06 
(–0.45) 
–0.17 
(–1.57) 
Constant –0.50 
(–2.86). 
0.48 
(2.75) 
0.38 
(1.58) 
–.0.76 
(5.48) 
R2 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.34 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
results show that the relationships become insignificant and show that this governance 
indicator do not affect the concentration of ownership. There is no reason to expect that 
firms where ownership is concentrated disclose more, however board composition has 
positive and significant role. This negative coefficient of law variable with corporate 
governance index suggests that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
quality of corporate governance is stronger in weak legal regime. This indicates that in 
the absence of adequate legal protection for investor, concentration of ownership become 
an instrument to resolve agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. 
This result confirms that ownership concentration is indeed a response of poor legal 
protection [La Porta, et al. (1999); Durnev and Kim (2006)]. The leverage is not a 
significant determinant of ownership concentration in all cases. The effect of investment 
opportunities is always positive and significant in all the models, which shows that more 
investment opportunities leads to more concentration of ownership and when firm suffers 
from a substantial drop in profitable investment opportunities, the controlling 
shareholders divert more corporate resources. Johnson (2000) documents such behaviour 
by Asian firms before the East Asian crisis. The impact of firm size and ownership 
concentration is negative indicating that ownership concentration is significantly lower as 
the firm size expands.  
As regards the results of effect of ownership concentration and firm valuation, the 
regression results are based on two accounting measures (ROA and ROE) and market 
measure that is Q-ratio for firm performance. Different specifications for each 
performance measure are estimated. The results are consistent with several empirical 
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findings that document a positive and significant relationship between ownership 
concentration by top five shareholders and firm performance implying that ownership 
concentration matters in determining firm’s value. Our result is in accordance with the 
findings of Lehmann and Weiggand (2000) for Germany, Leech and Leahy (1991) and 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) for UK. Another important finding is the favourable effect 
that market bestows on firms that follows good practices and is transparent. The positive 
and significant coefficient of corporate governance score and disclosure and transparency 
score imply that the firm that practice good governance and disclose more achieve 
superior performance compared to other firms. However, firm level variable show 
significant relationship with firm performance. The results reveal that large size firms are 
more likely to achieve better performance. The reason might be that the competition 
affects and the market power of large-sized firms enable them to out-perform small-size 
firms in Pakistan. Regarding other firm level variables the firms with more investment 
opportunities outperform compared to those which have less investment opportunities. 
The interaction term of corporate governance index with law enforcement term are not 
significant in any model suggesting that firm performance is not affected by rule of law 
in case of Pakistani firms where legal environment is weak. (Table 2)  
Table 2 
Evidence on Performance and Ownership Concentration by Top Five  
Tobin Q ROA ROE 
Owni  0.03** 
(1.51) 
0.12* 
(4.79) 
0.11* 
(4.41) 
0.12 
(4.72) 
0.12* 
(1.86) 
0.69** 
(1.54) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(1.18) 
0.13* 
(2.14) 
CGIi  0.01 
(0.49)   
0.29*** 
(1.47)   
0.03** 
(1.78)  
Disci   0.04* 
(2.83)   
0.01** 
(1.86)   
0.01** 
(1.67) 
Inv 0.03*** 
(1.41) 
0.03*** 
(1.42) 
0.03*** 
(1.39) 
0.03** 
(1.41) 
0.59*** 
(1.48) 
0.01** 
(1.84) 
0.48** 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
0.02** 
(1.66) 
Size 0.01* 
(2.33) 
0.02* 
(2.08) 
0.01** 
(1.84) 
0.02* 
(2.37) 
0.13 
(3.85) 
0.15*** 
(4.39) 
0.36** 
(1.97) 
0.12** 
(1.72) 
0.12 
(1.01) 
Law*CGIi  –0.02 
(0.64) 
–0.01* 
(–2.22)  
0.28 
(0.16) 
–0.10 
(–0.57)  
–0.01 
(–1.19) 
–0.03 
(–0.57) 
Intercept  0.11 
 (10.44) 
1.30 
(7.87) 
1.19 
(6.74) 
1.18 
(10.44) 
0.16 
(2.07) 
–1.10 
(–1.79) 
0.37 
(0.68) 
1.65 
(1.94) 
1.02 
(2.01) 
R Square 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.34 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
The type of ownership concentration varies across firms according to the identity 
of large shareholders, the relationship between firm performance and ownership type 
depends on who are the large shareholders. The concentration of ownership is split into 
four separate groups of owners: family ownership, foreign ownership, individual 
ownership and institutional ownership. The results reported in Table 3 indicate family 
and foreign ownership concentration have positive and significant effect on firm 
performance. The results do not indicate any impact of financial institution ownership 
and individual ownership concentration on firm value in any of our models. These 
findings are consistent with theoretical argument claiming that family owners and foreign  
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Table 3 
Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity  
Tobin Q ROA ROE 
Fam  0.22** 
(2.06) 
0.14* 
(1.97) 
0.09** 
(1.85) 
0.12** 
(2.27) 
0.21* 
(2.01) 
0.17* 
(1.98) 
0.21* 
(1.95) 
0.08* 
(1.88) 
0.05* 
(1.77) 
Fore 0.03* 
(1.98) 
0.02** 
(1.86) 
0.01** 
(1.96) 
0.04*** 
(1.66) 
0.02*** 
(1.76) 
0.13** 
(1.97) 
0.01 
(1.73) 
0.13** 
(1.85) 
0.02*** 
(1.57) 
Fii 0.13 
(1.21) 
0.10 
(1.14) 
0.10 
(0.74) 
0.0 5 
(1.41) 
0.13 
(1.36) 
0.04 
(1.07) 
0.01*** 
(1.67) 
0.04 
(0.82) 
0.01 
(1.13) 
Indvi 0.19 
(1.00) 
0.10 
(1.01) 
0.17*** 
(1.61) 
0.04 
(1.33) 
0.11 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(1.04 
0.02 
(0.51) 
0.01 
(0.51) 
0.12 
(0.97) 
CGIi  0.11** 
(1.86)   
0.15** 
(1.89)   
0.21*** 
(1.73)  
Disci   0.03** 
(1.96)   
0.02** 
(1.74)   
0.01*** 
(1.54) 
Sizei 0.04 
(0.90) 
0.07* 
(2.02) 
0.03** 
(1.82) 
0.04** 
(1.83) 
0.01** 
(1.84) 
0.01** 
(1.98) 
0.01* 
(2.36) 
0.02* 
(2.01) 
0.01* 
(1.87) 
Inv 0.03* 
(2.02) 
0.04*** 
(1.68) 
0.02** 
(1.79) 
0.02 
(1.40) 
0.02* 
(1.91) 
0.01* 
(1.89) 
0.001 
(0.95) 
0.02* 
(1.98) 
0.01** 
(1.69) 
Law*CGIi  0.02 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(1.02)  
–0.12 
(1.04) 
0.01 
(1.11)  
0.02 
(1.06) 
0.11 
(0.49) 
Intercept –0.62 
(–0.71) 
–2.13 
(–1.50) 
–2.77 
(–2.01) 
–0.77 
(–0.81) 
–0.80 
(–0.38) 
–0.54 
(–1.55) 
1.65 
(0.94) 
–2.15 
(–2.31) 
–1.11 
(–2.24) 
R2 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.38 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
owners bring better governance and monitoring practices. The positive and significant 
results of the family shareholdings are due to the fact that families control can reduce 
classical agency problem between owner and managers [Fama and Jensen (1983)] as 
shareholders with a large stake in the company have a greater incentive to play an active 
role in corporate decisions because they partially internalised the benefits from their 
monitoring efforts. James (1999) posits that families have longer investment horizons, 
leading to greater investment efficiency. Stein (1989) shows the presence of shareholders 
with relative long investment horizons can mitigate the incentive for myopic investment 
decisions by managers. Moreover the family’s historical presence, large equity position, 
and control of management and director posts place them in an extraordinary position to 
influence and monitor the firm.  
The positive affect of foreign ownership on performance is supported by Dahlquist 
and Robertson (2001).  They argue that foreign investors can complement the inadequate 
or inefficient monitoring of domestic institutions. Government authorities can effectively 
import the monitoring capability of institutional investors by opening local stock markets 
to foreign investors. In case of financial institution ownership it has no significant impact 
because firstly, the nominees on the board are typically bureaucrats and retired army 
officers with minimal expertise in corporate matters. Secondly, even if these agents of the 
government are equipped for the task of oversight in corporate matters they do not have a 
strong incentive to be effective monitors as their tenure and career prospects are rarely 
affected by the performance of the companies in which they serve on the board as 
nominees. 
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The owner-managers shows positive and significant impact on the firm 
performance in Table 4 and this result is in agreement with Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) who 
find that block-holdings by directors’ increase firm value. Owner managers have a strong 
incentive to manage their companies well and generate wealth as their fortunes are tied to 
the well being of the company. They are after all the promoters of the company and they 
have the greatest stakes (in tangible as well in intangible terms) in the success and 
failures of their companies. They have also excellent knowledge of the firm.  
Table 4 
Evidence on Performance and Manager-Ownership  
Tobin Q ROA ROE 
Dir 0.46** 
(3.20) 
0.24* 
(1.88) 
0.11** 
(1.97) 
0.12** 
(2.27) 
0.21* 
(2.01) 
0.27* 
(2.08) 
0.33* 
(1.95) 
0.08* 
(2.11) 
0.05* 
(1.98) 
CGIi  0.11** 
(1.74)   
0.04** 
(1.89)   
0.11*** 
(1.84)  
Disci   0.01* 
(1.96)   
0.02** 
(1.74)   
0.01*** 
(1.63) 
Inv 0.01* 
(1.98) 
0.03*** 
(1.77) 
0.02** 
(1.82) 
0.02*** 
(1.64) 
0.02* 
(1.91) 
0.01* 
(1.89) 
0.01 
(0.95) 
0.02* 
(1.98) 
0.04** 
(1.69) 
Size 0.04 
(0.90) 
0.27* 
(2.02) 
0.13** 
(1.82) 
0.04** 
(1.83) 
0.21** 
(1.84) 
0.10** 
(2.01) 
0.25* 
(2.72) 
0.03* 
(2.72) 
0.02* 
(1.98) 
Law*CGIi  0.02 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(1.02)  
–0.12 
(1.04) 
0.01 
(1.11) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
0.02 
(1.06) 
0.11 
(0.49) 
Intercept –0.62 
(–0.71) 
–2.13 
(–1.50) 
–2.77 
(–2.01) 
–0.77 
(–0.81) 
–0.80 
(–0.38) 
–0.54 
(–1.55) 
1.65 
(0.94) 
–2.15 
(–2.31) 
–1.11 
(–2.24) 
R2 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.38 
Note:  The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics  
The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency have positive 
affect on performance as reported in Tables 3 and 4. The results support our previous 
findings that size and investment opportunities have significant effect in most of the 
models. As regards the quality of legal environment the interaction terms of rule of law 
with ownership concentration shows no relationship with firm performance; which 
suggests that concentration of ownership is substitute for weak legal protection. [La 
Porta, et al. (2000)].  
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study determines the factors influencing the ownership concentration, and the 
effect of this on the other aspects such as firm performance using representative sample 
of 60 firms for the period 2003 to 2008. The results reveal that in Pakistan corporations 
has more concentration of ownership which is the response of weak legal environment 
and this result validates the La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) findings. The 
concentration of ownership seems to have positive effect on firms’ profitability and 
performance measures. There is negative association between corporate governance 
practices and disclosures and transparency with concentration of ownership. The identity 
of ownership matters more than the concentration of ownership. The family, foreign and 
director ownership has positive affect on firm performance. The results indicate that firm 
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specific factors affect more in concentration of ownership. The findings reveal that more 
investment opportunities provides greater opportunity to for ownership concentration, 
however, size has opposite effect and leads to delusion of ownership. It results in diverse 
ownership to get wider access to funds and share ownership. These results are consistent 
with studies Boubakri, et al. (2003). The legal environment has no impact on 
concentration of ownership or on firm performance [La Porta, et al. (2002)]. The broad 
implication that emerges from this study is that ownership concentration is an 
endogenous response of poor legal protection of the investors and seems to have 
significant effect on firm performance. It requires implementation of corporate 
governance reforms at most at par with real sector and financial sector reforms.  
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